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REAL PROPERTY-1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY*
THOMAS G. ROADY, JR.**
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I. TITLES AND DEEDS-CONSTRUCTION-VALIDITY OF
RESTRAINT ON MARRIAGE CLAUSE
Probably no area of the law is fraught with more confusion than
that involving construction of clauses in deeds and wills which impose
some restraint on the conduct of grantees or devisees- seemingly not
in the best interest of society. Clauses which tend to deter grantees
or devisees from marriage or remarriage have constituted a fertile
source of litigation for centuries. And though the stated rules of law
prohibit and restrict the use of marriage or remarriage as a condition
to vest or divest interests in real property, there are very few cases
in which the courts in this country or in England, when uncontrolled
by statutes, have reached unqualified decisions against the legality of
general restraints on marriage. This general result is fully supportable
on principle. Unfortunately, however, the tendency of courts faced
with construing such clauses has been to search for precedents; usually
they have not been amenable to an independent and thorough analysis
of underlying policy nor of the purpose and intent of grantors and
testators in attempting such restraints.' We now have, as a result of
*Although a number of cases involving questions in the area of real property
were decided during the survey period, some of them were assigned to writers
of other survey articles and have been examined in excellent fashion by the
writers of those articles. They will not, therefore, be discussed in this section.
See particularly Smedley, Equity-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 VAND. L. REV.
1281 (1961) and Trautman, Decedents' Estates, Trusts and Future Interests1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 VAND. L. REV. 1253 (1961).
**Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee and Illinois
bars.
1. Many of the decisions involving restraint on marriage clauses and much
of the writing on this subject reveals the strong desire to set up some kind
of mathematical formulae for dealing with such clauses. Ordinarily, for
example, it is assumed that a total restraint of marriage is void and that a
partial restraint is valid only if reasonable. In fact, the court in Harbin v.
Judd, 340 S.W.2d 935 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960) gave lip service to this general
principle. An examination of authorities should be required reading for all
students of the law. The following are recommended as being most helpful:
6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY ch. III (Casner ed. 1952); 6 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY §§ 850-53 (1958); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 424-38 (1944); Brow1387
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the decision in Harbin v. Judd,2 a substantial holding in this jurisdiction that should do much to bring order out of the confusion which
has heretofore existed in this area of the law.
In Harbin v. Judd the court was confronted with the problem of
construing the following clause contained in a deed to property which
was in the chain of title of land involved in an action for partition
and sale. Distribution of the proceeds of the sale depended upon the
effect of the following clause:
Second: Upon the marriage of any of said beneficiaries or equitable
owners, his or her interest shall vest in and become the property equally
of the unmarried sisters or sister, during her or their unmarried state,
but upon the marriage of the last unmarried sister, the property shall
vest or re-vest in all of the aforesaid beneficial or equitable owners, in
the said proportions or percentages stated; and this trust shall cease and
terminate and said beneficial owners shall become the legal as well as
equitable owners in the proportions stated in fee without conditions,
limitations or restrictions. 3
The chancellor in the partition action had held that this provision
divesting the interests of the beneficiaries named in the deed was one
involving a general restraint against marriage and therefore void.
The court of appeals, in a decision by Judge Humphreys, sustained the
assignment of error and held the restraint valid.
After acknowledging the general rule prohibiting total restraints on
marriage, Judge Humphreys proceeded to interpret the clause as falling within one of the well-recognized qualifications of the rule. The
clause as construed was held to involve a conditional limitation and
not a condition subsequent which placed it without the scope of the
rule. Assuming that the analysis on this point is accurate, there was
ample authority in Tennessee and elsewhere to support the result. 4
The distinction drawn by Judge Humphreys is the most widely accepted qualification to the rule prohibiting restraints on marriage and
one supported by a vast quantity of authority.5
Without going into an analysis of the particular clause in question
to determine whether or not it was properly construed to involve a
conditional limitation rather than a condition subsequent, it is to be
hoped that the alternative grounds for the decision, as stated by
der, Conditions and Limitations in Restraint of Marriage, 39 MICH. L. REv.
1288 (1941); Schnebly, Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44
YALE L.J. 961, 1186, 1380 (1935).
2. 340 S.W.2d 935 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
3. Id. at 936.
4. Hughes v. Boyd, 34 Tenn. 511 (1855) and other authorities cited in the
opinion.
5. Note citations in: 6 AMER cAN LAW OP PROPERTY § 27.14 (Casner ed.
1952); 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 853 (1958); 4 THoMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY §
1882 (1961); 35 Am. JUR. Marriage § 258 (1941).
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Judge Humphreys, will be used to determine the validity of such
clauses in the future. Because it is such an important contribution
in an area of confusion, the language of the court is set out at length
as follows:
We believe we must determine the reasonableness of restraint, not alone
upon the terms of the provision as urged by appellee, but the relation of
the parties and the purpose for which the restraintwas imposed, and the
facts surrounding the imposition of the restraint must be taken into consideration.6
When this approach was used, it appeared obvious that the parties
to the deed had no intent or desire to prevent marriage of any of the
beneficiaries. Their purpose was clearly established as being to provide a home for the beneficiaries which could not be disturbed or
broken up by the subsequent marriage of one or more of them.
The decision in Harbin v. Judd is a fortuitous one in the opinion of
this writer. It provides the courts in this state with a guide which can
be logically and consistently applied in an area heretofore marked
with frustration and confusion. Though it is recognized that valid
arguments exist to the contrary, the policy of the law would seem to
be best served by making the validity of restraints on marriage turn
on the purpose or intent with which such clauses are used. To make
validity turn on the form in which the restraint is couched emphasizes form over substance, permits the careful draftsman to defeat
the underlying social policy of the law and leads courts to make
distinctions where none in fact exist. Where there is no intent or
purpose to restrain a beneficiary, grantee, devisee or legatee from
marriage, it is quite unlikely that his conduct will be greatly influenced by a clause where restraint is imposed for other desirable
purposes.
II. VENDOR AND PURCHASER
The legal effect of a retention by the vendor of payments made
by the vendee under a contract for sale was in issue in G. H. Swope
Building Corp. v. Horton.7 In this case, the vendor sued the vendee
for damages resulting from the vendee's refusal to purchase. This
constituted a breach of his contract with the plaintiff.
The contract for Sale, after acknowledging receipt by the plaintiff of
$250 to be credited on the purchase price, contained the following
language:
Should I [vendee] revoke or withdraw this offer or refuse to carry out
its terms, then the owner may at his option, (1) retain the sum of money
6. 340 S.W.2d at 939. (Emphasis added.)
7. 338 S.W.2d 566 (Tenn. 1960).
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deposited which I agree shall constitute liquidated damages for my failure
or refusal to abide by the terms of the offer, or (2) proceed to enforce
his legal rights, if any.8

The plaintiff had retained the deposit alleging in his complaint that
he would credit it to any sum he might recover in the action for
breach of contract. The defendant demurred and plaintiff asked leave
to amend by striking the allegation above referred to and inserting in
lieu thereof that, pursuant to the contract, the $250 had been deposited
with a real estate broker in part payment of his commission. The
proposed amendment requested the real estate broker be made a
party so that rights as to the $250 could be fully determined.

The chancellor denied permission to amend and the plaintiff vendor
appealed. The supreme court, in an opinion by Tomlinson, affirmed
the chancellor's denial of permission to amend even though Tennessee
Code Annotated section 21-108 on its face would appear to permit
amendment at that stage of the proceeding.
The action of the vendor in this case is construed as constituting, in
law, an election to retain the deposit. The court did not believe that
the vendor's act of putting the $250 in the hands of a third person
could materially affect his rights under the contract of sale. The
language used in the contract provided for alternative remedies in
event of default by the purchaser and the vendor could not avail
himself of both of them. Having elected to retain the deposit as
liquidated damages, he could not then pursue any other action as a
result of the vendee's breach. The court cited one Tennessee decision

as tending to support the result and then argued that it was also
strongly supportable on principle. It is difficult to conceive of any

other result being reached in the face of the express language of the
contract. Without such language, however, the retention by the
vendor of payments made under the contract would not necessarily
bar other actions by him based on the vendee's breach.
III. EMINENT DOMAIN

The current significance of the law of eminent domain is illustrated
by two cases decided by the supreme court during the survey period.
It is reasonable to expect that our courts will continue to be flooded
by eminent domain actions and that many of them will find their
way to the supreme court in an attempt by parties to clarify the law
in a rapidly developing area. The law of eminent domain is in many
respects ancient, but it is not fully understood or appreciated by
8. Id. at 567.
9. Thompson v. Exchange Bldg. Co., 157 Tenn. 275, 8 S.W.2d 489 (1928).
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many attorneys and the average layman who finds.himself a defendant
in a condemnation action often is unhappy with the outcome. Much of
the unhappiness flows from arbitrary and thoughtless acts of those
administering the statutes providing the procedures to be followed in
the taking of private land for public use. In fact, after reading all of
the reported cases in Tennessee on this subject, the writer is convinced that much of the litigation could have been avoided with a
little more patience and foresight on the part of the administrators.
But not all of it, for some individuals just do not like the idea of
giving up their "castles" to the "government" and many are just plain
greedy. A combination of these factors assures us that the volume of
litigation will not diminish. In view of the expanding character of
governmental activities it will, in fact, increase.
In State v. Williams'0 the Tennessee Supreme Court considered the
authority of the commissioner of highways, proceeding under applicable Tennessee statutes and federal laws, to designate certain highways as "limited-access" highways and to limit access to such a highway to certain specified points. In the instant case, the commissioner
had so designated a highway and had caused a fence to be erected
along the boundary of the project, which fence barred defendant from
exercising a claimed easement of way which the highway crossed.
Defendant had resorted to self-help by cutting the fence and crossing
the limited access way which made his walk to the mailbox shorter
and also provided a closer route for his children to the school bus stop
and for the doctor to defendant's home. The commissioner sued to
enjoin any further such acts and obtained a temporary injunction
granting such relief. The defendant by answer and cross-bill sought
to enjoin the commissioner from maintaining the fence across his
alleged easement of way and the chancellor then modified the injunction so as to permit defendant to use his claimed right of way.
The commissioner was enjoined from erecting the fence. His demurrer was overruled and a discretionary appeal allowed. The appeal
from modification of the temporary injunction was denied whereupon
the commissioner petitioned for certiorari and supersedeas which was
granted by a member of the supreme court. After a hearing, the
opinion of the court written by Justice Burnett reversed the chancellor
and granted the injunction prayed for by the commissioner. The
commissioner's demurrer to the cross-bill was sustained and that
action dismissed.
The decision contains strong language as to the extensive power of
the state, acting through its authorities, to control access to highways.
Citing with approval Tennessee Code Annotated section 54-2003, the
10. 343 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1961).
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opinion concludes that such determinations of design are final. The
extent to which the court would go in sustaining action by the highway authorities is indicated by the following language:
We will take judicial knowledge of the fact that such highways are being
constructed now from one end of the country to the other ....
The
courts without exception have thus held that it is the right of those of
the State and Federal governments in constructing such highways to
control these access facility roads for entrances or for crossing these
highways .

. .

. The mere fact of controlling these entrances and exits

at certain places is for the public welfare and safety of the traveling as
well as the pedestrian public.11
In the instant case, the court pointed out that the defendant could
proceed against the county under a reverse condemnation action as
provided for in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 23-1423 and 1424
to recover damages for the cutting of his right-of-way. In short, all
defendant is entitled to is compensation for the interest taken and he
can get it under the statutory method. The court has made it clear
that they will not interfere with or review decisions of the commissioner locating and constructing limited access highways or
require him to build an access way in a manner he does not deem
best. Further, they will protect the exercise of such discretion by the
commissioner with the injunctive process.
In Strasser v. City of Nashville 2 the supreme court in an opinion by
Justice Tomlinson affirmed Chancellor Lentz of Davidson County in
his decision granting defendant's motion to dismiss the chancery
action. The complainant was asserting via declaratory judgment the
right of a condemnee to enjoin the continuance of condemnation
proceedings in the law court. It was held that complainants had an
adequate remedy at law either in the pending action by the highway
commissioner to acquire some 80 acres of defendant's farm for highway purposes and/or by reverse condemnation action against the city
if the taking of a "clear zone" for airport purposes was not fully
compensated for in the highway condemnation.
One suspects that before there is an end to the litigation over
petitioner's farm that many more chapters will be written. The land
being condemned for highway purposes by the state department of
highways is admittedly valuable land, located in an area being rapidly
enveloped by an expanding community. In addition, it is somewhat
anomalous, from the landowner's point of view, that the very land
which is being condemned in fee is also within the "clear zone" of a
new jet runway recently completed at the municipal airport. There
11. Id. at 859.
12. 336 S.W.2d 16 (Tenn. 1960).
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is no question about it, Strasser is in a bind and there is little he can
do about it. Obviously, if the condemnation action by the highway
department is successfully concluded, the landowner will have lost
the fee and with it any right to compensation for use of the airspace
above it. He will, of course, still be able to hold the airport authority
for any damage to land not taken for highway purposes.
It is pure speculation, but not illogical, to say that the landowner
would have netted far more had the condemnation of a "clear zone"
preceded condemnation of the fee for highway purposes. But it does
not mean, as the decision of the court implies, that the owner will not
be fully compensated for what is taken. Much as he might have desired a reversal of the order of taking, it cannot be accomplished via
chancery. It looks as if the city taxpayer may be the happy beneficiary
of planned or unplanned delay by the city in instituting condemnation
proceedings for the clear zone at the end of the new jet runway. An
interesting question as to the time of taking would have been presented had the land owner instituted his action for reverse condemnation against the city at the time lengthening of the runway began.

IV.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

It is common practice to include in a lease of real property a clause
giving the landlord a right to claim a forfeiture of the tenant's
interests under certain specified circumstances. The typical clause
will cover non-payment of rent, failure to pay taxes or keep premises
insured and, quite commonly, the failure of the tenant to occupy
and keep the premises in good repair. Such clauses are usually framed
so as to give the landlord the right to enter the property. Rarely is
it desirable to provide for an automatic forfeiture. The landlord, in
short, desires flexibility as to the course of action he can pursue and
the automatic, special limitation type of forfeiture clause tends to
shift control to the tenant. The landlord, under one of these clauses,
is often in a vulnerable position because of the tendency of equity to
relieve the tenant except where breaches of the lease are "substantial." Oftentimes a landlord finds that his failure to act promptly in
asserting his rights under such a clause constitutes a "waiver" or in
some instances an "estoppel." In the case of Chapman Drug Co. v.
Chapman,13 we have an example of a landlord failing to pursue in
timely fashion his right to forfeit for breach of a lease by the tenant
and this even though the alleged breaches constituted acts in the
nature of waste.
The Chapman case could well have been discussed with the vendor13. 341 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. 1960).
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purchaser material above; the question in the case was resolved by
holding that on exercise by a tenant of an option to purchase, the
law of vendor and purchaser applies and the landlord-tenant relationship terminates. The case is another example of many where the key
to problem solving in the law of vendor-purchaser is the doctrine of
"equitable conversion." In short, the doctrine means that when an
enforceable contract for the purchase and sale of realty exists, the
purchaser is regarded from that time in equity as the owner and the
vendor holds the bare legal title as security for the unpaid portion of
the purchase price. The conversion is of the vendor's land ownership
to personalty and the purchaser's contract right into realty. Following the theory to logical conclusions has been a favorite exercise of
lawyers and judges for generations. It is this conceptual type of
thinking which is oftentimes criticized 14 but nonetheless determinative
of many issues. In the instant case, there is little reason to criticize
the method or result. Unfortunately, this is not always true. 15
In the Chapman case, the lease involved contained an option to
purchase which the court found as a fact had been exercised by the
lessee in accordance with its terms. Subsequent to the exercise of the
option by the lessee-defendant, the landlord-plaintiff instituted this
action to void the lease and for possession and damages. The basis of
the action was wasteful acts allegedly committed by the defendant
prior to the exercise of the option. The defendant demurred to the
action alleging specifically that by exercise of the option the equitable
title to the property passed to the defendant subject only to payment
of the agreed purchase price. This demurrer was overruled and a
discretionary appeal allowed. The supreme court, in an opinion by
Tomlinson, reversed the decree of the chancellor and held that
exercise by defendant of the option to purchase 'in the lease changed
the relationship of plaintiff and defendant from landlord and tenant
to vendor and purchaser. It appears that the court felt plaintiff's right
was thereby limited to the agreed upon purchase price.
The view of the court that exercise of an option to purchase
property terminates the landlord and tenant relationship and creates
the relation of vendor and purchaser is supported by seemingly inexhaustible authority. 16 Certainly, the lessor cannot thereafter successfully urge a forfeiture of the lease for conditions imposed on the
tenant by the lease where the acts complained of occur subsequent
14. See particularly the opinion of Cardozo in Hynes v. New York Cent.
R.R., 231 N.Y. 229, 131 N.E. 898 (1921).
15. See Roady, Real Property-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV.
1188, 1194 (1957).
16. See citations in principal case and in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §
3.84 (Casner ed. 1952).
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to an exercise by the lessee of the option. But it does not necessarily
follow that he should not be permitted to assert a forfeiture based on
acts of the lessee prior to an exercise of the option. In so holding the
court seems to be doing either or both of two things: (1) applying
some sort of estoppel or waiver against the landlord; (2) recognizing,
in a left-handed way, the fiction of relation-back which has been
somewhat discredited in the option cases by American decisions.17
On principle, it is difficult to see how the landlord can complain. He
had given the option voluntarily which (assuming other essentials)
created a binding agreement. Breach of a covenant in the lease agreement, unless made expressly a condition precedent to the exercise of
the option to purchase, would not normally deprive the lessee of his
right to exercise the option. Nothing short of that, or a forfeiture or
other termination of the lease for breach of covenants contained
therein before exercise of the option, could defeat it. Here, the landlord, if he had grounds for forfeiting the tenant's interest, had not
asserted them in timely fashion.
One further observation should be made. Finding that there has
been an equitable conversion on exercise of the option does not in
itself prevent the landlord-vendor from proceeding against his lesseepurchaser for waste. It is implicit that after the equitable conversion
the interest of the vendor is similar to that of a mortgagee. It is
basically a security interest. The vendee can commit acts of waste
and a vendor would be entitled to relief in equity, perhaps even to
the extent of foreclosing his vendor's lien. Admittedly, the acts of the
vendee would have to be of a substantial nature for the cases indicate
that relief would depend on the vendor showing that his security
interest is impaired. This is not easy to do. 18
17. Ibid. One can see that, after finding an equitable conversion on exercise
of the option, that it might be- helpful to then hold that the conversion relates
back to the date when the option was given. The English court used this
fiction in Lawes v. Bennett, 1 Cox 167, 29 Eng. Rep. 1111 (Ch. 1785) in
determining who was entitled to the proceeds of a sale where the lessor died
after executing the lease but before the option was exercised. Some American
decisions have taken this view, particularly where a lessee after exercise claims

a condemnation award or proceeds of an insurance policy carried by the

vendor on the premises partially destroyed by fire. See, particularly, Cullen

& V. Co. v. Bender Co., 122 Ohio St. 82, 170 N.E. 633 (1930) and Gard v.
Razanskas, 248 Iowa 1333, 85 N.W.2d 612 (1957), noted in 9 SYRAcusE L. REv.
321 (1958).
18. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 648, 649 (1956); 3 AMERIcAN LAW OF

PROPERTY § 11.32 (Casner ed. 1952).

